Subject: 89-658 --

DISSENT, CHEEK v. UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 89-658 JOHN L. CHEEK, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit [January 8, 1991] Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Marshall joins, dissenting. It seems to me that we are concerned in this case not with "the complexity of the tax laws," ante, at 7, but with the income tax law in its most elementary and basic aspect: Is a wage earner a taxpayer and are wages income? The Court acknowledges that the conclusively established standard for willfulness under the applicable statutes is the "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." Ante, at 8. See United States v. Bishop, 412 U. S. 346, 360 (1963), and United States v. Pomponio, 429 U. S. 10, 12 (1976). That being so, it is incomprehensible to me how, in this day, more than 70 years after the institution of our present federal income tax system with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 166, any taxpayer of competent mentality can assert as his defense to charges of statutory willfulness the proposition that the wage he receives for his labor is not income, irrespective of a cult that says otherwise and advises the gullible to resist income tax collections. One might note in passing that this particular taxpayer, after all, was a licensed pilot for one of our major commercial airlines; he presumably was a person of at least minimum intellectual competence. The District Court's instruction that an objectively reasonable and good faith misunderstanding of the law negates willfulness lends further, rather than less, protection to this defendant, for it added an additional hurdle for the prosecution to overcome. Petitioner should be grateful for this further protection, rather than be opposed to it. This Court's opinion today, I fear, will encourage taxpayers to cling to frivolous views of the law in the hope of convincing a jury of their sincerity. If that ensues, I suspect we have gone beyond the limits of common sense. While I may not agree with every word the Court of Appeals has enunciated in its opinion, I would affirm its judgment in this case. I therefore dissent. ----------------------------------------------------------------- -------------